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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

"express agreement to the contrary," the statute is not controlling ....51a
The lease in question is distinguishable from those in the above cases for
there is in fact no contrary agreement concerning the tenants right of
termination. But arguably, there is such an agreement concerning apportionment; the lease provides that the tenant shall pay all rent to the date of the
fire, the statute rendering him liable for rent to the date of surrender.
It is submitted that the Court's holding is a liberalization of the rule
laid down in Seigel and Coast Delicatessen, a conscious progression away from
the strict common law rules of non-termination and apportionment, evidenced
in the opinion of the Supreme Court at Special Term, so as to fully effectuate
the sense and spirit of Section 227 of the Real Property Law.
The dissenting judge reasoned that since the tenant was denied summary
judgment against the landlord at Special Term and no appeal was taken, the
appeal was limited only as to the suit by the tenant and the insurance company
on the fire policy. Thus restricted, he argued that the policy had no meaning
whatever and covered no risk unless the insured and the insurer were in effect
agreeing that in the event of fire the insurance company would reimburse the
tenant for prepaid rent. Any other construction, it is said, would be manifestly
against common sense and justice, as it would allow the insurer to write a policy
and accept a premium without assuming any risk whatsoever.
It is submitted that the fact that the tenant applied for insurance, or that
the insurance company wrote the policy, does not necessarily mean that he, or
the insurer, construed the lease to deny the tenant the right to the return of any
advance rental. Had that been the construction put on the insurance contract
by the parties thereto, they would have simply defined the insured's "leasehold
interest" as "the amount of advance rental paid by the insured" without
adding-as they did----"and not recoverable under the term of the lease." Be that
as it may, it is likely that the tenant procured the insurance simply because he
was not sure what his rights were under the various contingencies which could
eventuate and wanted to provide against any and all of them.
R.D. G.
CONSTRUCTION OF A NOTICE or TERmiNATION IN A LEASE OF REAL PROPERTY

In Morlee Sales Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Company,52 the Court of

Appeals was required to construe a "notice of termination" clause in a lease
of real estate to determine whether the purchaser of the property might
terminate the lease. Paragraph 18 of the lease provided:
That if the Landlord should sell said premises, prior to the expiration
of this lease and the purchaser thereof desires possession of said
premises, then and in that event, the Tenant will cancel this lease and
51a. Id. at 929, 24 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
52. 9 N.Y.2d 16, 210 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1961).
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surrender possession of said premises, . . . upon receiving 60 days
written notice of the cancellation of this lease....
The seller-landlord had entered into a contract to sell the leased premises
to Manufacturers Trust Company, hereinafter referred to as the Bank, and
several weeks later, formal title was conveyed. Subsequent to the passage of
title, the Bank, in strict compliance with paragraph 18 of the lease, notified
53
Morlee, the tenant in possession, that the lease was to be cancelled in 60 days.
Morlee then instituted an action against the Bank in the Supreme Court,
Kings County, for a declaration that the attempted termination of the lease
was invalid. Morlee argued that the Bank was not a landlord who was about
to sell the premises, which Morlee contended was required by paragraph 18 of
the lease. Thereafter, the Bank instituted a summary dispossess proceeding
against Morlee,54 and the action and the proceeding were consolidated in the
Supreme Court.55
The Supreme Court, concluding that this exact question was decided by
Furio v. Smith,56 entered judgment for Morlee and dismissed the dispossess
proceeding instituted by the Bank. 57 The Appellate Division affirmed 58 on the
basils of 112 East 36th St. Holding Corp. v. Daffos59 and Furio v. Smith. 0
On appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the decision below
and held that a purchaser could, under paragraph 18 of the lease, cancel the
lease if he purchased the property with that intent and did not assume the
position of landlord after the purchase, i.e., by waiting an unreasonable amount
of time before canceling, or by accepting rent from the tenant in possession prior
to sending a cancellation notice. In other words, the cancellation must be in
connection with the sale of the property.
In its opinion, the Court stated that the reasoning attributed to the cases
cited in Furio v. Smith6 should not be followed, and that the Daffos case was
distinguishable on the grounds that in that case there was a waiver of the
purchaser's right to terminate because he had assumed the position of landlord
by accepting rent and by waiting an unreasonable amount of time before giving
notice; in effect, an attornment had occurred.
Furio v. Smith 62 involved an identical cancellation provision, but in that
case, the purchaser of the property informed the tenants that the lease would
be cancelled only if the tenants were not interested in purchasing the property.
53. See Annot., 116 A.L.R. 931, 933 (1938); Annot. 163 A.L.R. 1019 (1946).
54. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1410.
55. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1426-a.
56. 272 App. Div. 941, 72 N.Y.S.2d 425 (2d Dep't 1947).
57. 16 Misc. 2d 599, 185 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
58. 11 A.D.2d 796, 205 N.Y.S.2d 979 (2d Dep't 1960).
59. 273 App. Div. 447, 78 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 763, 83
N.E.2d 462 (1948).
60. Supra note 56.
61. Ibid.
62. Supra note 56.
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The decision was a memorandum by the court and stated simply that "The
notice served upon the tenants is ineffectual to cancel the lease as a consequence
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but never actually clarified its meaning. Therefore, one could not be certain
whether the notice served was ineffectual because its form did not comply with
the provisions of paragraph 18, or whether it was ineffectual because it was
given by the purchaser and not the seller-landlord.
Assuming then, as Morlee did, that Furio stood for the proposition that a
purchaser could not cancel under the lease, Morlee's most compelling argument
was that they should be allowed to rely upon the law as it existed at the time
he entered into the lease. At first blush, this argument has a great deal of
appeal, for "rules of law on which men rely on in their business dealings should
not be changed in the middle of the game." 66 And certainly as Morlee
contended, there were no great public or moral issues involved which necessitated
a re-examination of pre-existing legal precedents. 6
However, a closer examination of the facts reveals that this argument
presupposes that the intention of the parties when they entered into the contract
was that only the landlord would have the right to give notice of termination.
And as the Court of Appeals so clearly pointed out, it seems unlikely that this
would have been the agreement, for the landlord, in agreeing to such a contract,
would have subjected himself, if he ever decided to sell, to the risk of losing a
tenant before he was assured that title would close.
In addition to what was discerned to be the intention of the parties at the
time they entered into the lease, the court also noted that the language of the
lease referred to a sale and not a contract to sell and did not require that notice
be given by any particular party. Therefore, the Court concluded, to interpret
the lease as allowing only the landlord to give notice, as Morlee contended it
should be interpreted, would have been reading meaning into the lease that
was not there, and in effect, would be making a new contract for the parties
67
under the guise of interpreting the writing.
J. S. M.
63. Supra note 56 at 941, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
64. Hotel Dauphin, Inc. v. Remey, 53 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 1945), (Purchaser
attempted to cancel the lease over a year and a half after he had purchased the property) ;
Payne v. Brathwaite, 113 Misc. 517, 185 N.Y. Supp. 107 (Sup. Ct. 1920), (The lease provided
that "the lessor shall have the privilege of terminating the within lease at any time in
the event of a sale of the premises by giving sixty (60) days written notice."); Krim
Realty Corp. v. Varveri, 97 Misc. 407, 161 N.Y. Supp. 229 (Sup. Ct. 1916), (The lease provided that the landlord may cancel this lease).
65. 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
66. See Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); Sears, Roebuck
and Co. v. 9. Avenue-31 Street Corp., 274 N.Y. 388, 9 N.E.2d 20 (1937).
67. Green v. Doniger, 300 N.Y. 238, 90 N.E.2d 56 (1949); Raner v. Goldberg, 244
N.Y. 438, 155 N.E. 733 (1927).

